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CAN WE ADDRESS ORBITAL DEBRIS WITH THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW WE ALREADY HAVE? AN
EXAMINATION OF TREATY INTERPRETATION AND
THE DUE REGARD PRINCIPLE
JOHN S. GOEHRING*
ABSTRACT
India’s controversial anti-satellite test in 2019 provides the
United States an opportunity to demonstrate leadership in
preventing future debris-generating events. However, new inter-
national space laws or norms are unlikely. Instead, the United
States could look to the international space law already in place,
particularly the due regard principle contained within Article IX
of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (Article IX). Ignored through-
out its history, Article IX’s due regard principle has untapped
potential. States, through their practice in the application of
treaties, can shape the interpretation of treaty provisions in or-
der to accommodate changing circumstances. The United States
has experience in applying this approach to the space domain,
having established practices to shape interpretations of the legal
concepts of peaceful purposes and non-appropriation. If the
United States seeks to lead an international effort to address the
threat of orbital debris, then the due regard principle presents a
possible tool well worth considering. This Article examines the
potential of the due regard principle, the possibility of establish-
ing a functional meaning, and some considerations involved in
pursuing such a course of action.
* John. S. Goehring (LL.M., McGill University, Institute of Air and Space Law;
B.A., University of California, Berkeley; J.D., Tulane Law School) is a space and
international law attorney for the Department of Defense. The opinions
expressed in this Article are those of the author and do not reflect the position of
the U.S. government or Department of Defense.
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I. INTRODUCTION
ON MARCH 27, 2019, INDIA conducted a kinetic anti-satel-lite (ASAT) test against its own orbiting satellite, asserting
its place as a “global space power.”1 The test initially created
over 400 pieces of debris in low Earth orbit (LEO).2 By design,
the test impacted a target at a relatively low altitude of under
300 kilometers (under 180 miles) in order to avoid long-lasting
orbital debris.3 Simulations conducted prior to the test indi-
cated all the debris would deorbit within forty-five days.4 How-
ever, of the 101 catalogued pieces of trackable debris, over forty
pieces remained in orbit nearly three months later.5 By the end
of 2019, eighteen pieces still remained.6 At least a dozen pieces
of debris were launched into orbits over 1,000 kilometers (over
621 miles) in altitude, with one piece reaching 2,222 kilometers
(about 1,380 miles) in altitude.7
1 William Harwood, India’s Anti-Satellite Weapon Test Sent Debris Flying That Could





3 Id. (“[T]he test . . . had been conducted to intercept a satellite at about 280
kilometers.”); The Wire Staff, DRDO Defends ‘Shakti’ Test as Experts Say Indian ASAT
Debris ‘Threatens All LEO Sats,’ THE WIRE (June 4, 2019), https://thewire.in/
space/drdo-defends-shakti-test-as-experts-say-indian-asat-debris-threatens-all-leo-
sats [https://perma.cc/UEY3-YGFD].
4 Sanjeev Miglani, India Says Space Debris From Anti-Satellite Test to ‘Vanish’ in 45
Days, REUTERS (Mar. 28, 2019, 6:52 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-in-
dia-satellite/india-says-space-debris-from-anti-satellite-test-to-vanish-in-45-days-
idUSKCN1R91DM [https://perma.cc/D4YQ-UKHG].
5 Adam Forrest, Debris From Satellite Blown Up By India Still Flying Around Earth,
Six Weeks After Delhi Claimed It Should Have Decayed, THE INDEPENDENT (June 26,
2019, 11:35 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/india-satellite-
debris-space-junk-missile-test-nasa-earth-orbit-a8975231.html [https://perma.cc/
CM3U-ADS5] (forty-one out of 101 pieces of debris over six weeks later); NASA
Orbital Debris Program Office, Two Breakup Events Reported, 23 NASA ORBITAL
DEBRIS Q. NEWS 1, 1 (Aug. 2019), https://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/quarterly-
news/pdfs/odqnv14i3.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5YF-447E] (forty-nine out of 101
pieces of debris as of July 15, 2019).
6 Jonathan McDowell (@planet4589), TWITTER (Dec. 27, 2019, 10:54 PM),
https://twitter.com/planet4589/status/1210786046943739904 [https://
perma.cc/DQU5-FKGA].
7 Caleb Henry, India ASAT Debris Spotted Above 2,200 Kilometers, Will Remain a
Year or More In Orbit, SPACE NEWS (Apr. 9, 2019), https://spacenews.com/india-
asat-debris-spotted-above-2200-kilometers-will-last-a-year-or-more/ [https://
perma.cc/Q8MY-4PHS].
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The Indian ASAT test presents an opportunity for the United
States to show leadership in an international effort to prevent
future debris-generating events in space. The U.S. Department
of State did not publicly express alarm over India’s test; a
spokesperson stated, “Now, the issue of space debris, that is an
important concern for the United States, and I would say that
we took note of the Indian Government’s statements that the
test was designed to address space debris issues.”8 However,
other responses within the government signaled disapproval
and, perhaps, a willingness to discuss solutions to the problem
of deliberate creation of orbital debris. Patrick Shanahan, then
the Acting Secretary of Defense, said, “I think not having rules
of engagement is worrisome. . . . I would expect anyone who
tests does not put at risk anyone else’s assets.”9 General John
Hyten, then the commander of U.S. Strategic Command and
now the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, responded,
“[A]ll debris is bad, and I hope for the day when we have norms
of behavior, and I think the place to start is with debris-creating
events.”10 National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) Administrator Jim Bridenstine said after the test that it
“is a terrible, terrible thing to create an event that sends debris
at an apogee that goes above the International Space Station.”11
Bridenstine added, “That kind of activity is not compatible with
the future of human spaceflight” and “it is not acceptable for us
to allow people to create orbital debris fields that put at risk our
8 Press Briefing, Brian Hook, Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t of State
(Apr. 2, 2019, 2:51 PM), https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-brief-
ing-april-2-2019/ [https://perma.cc/7ADN-9FT3].
9 Phil Stewart, U.S. Studying India Anti-Satellite Weapons Test, Warns of Space Deb-
ris, REUTERS (Mar. 27, 2019, 1:39 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-
satellite-usa/us-studying-india-anti-satellite-weapons-test-warns-of-space-debris-id
USKCN1R825Z [https://perma.cc/FSH6-AN2E] (quoting Patrick Shanahan).
10 Colin Clark & Theresa Hitchens, STRATCOM’s Hyten Calls for Space Rules Af-
ter India’s ASAT Test: Update, BREAKING DEFENSE (Apr. 9, 2019, 4:35 PM), https://
breakingdefense.com/2019/04/stratcoms-hyten-calls-for-space-rules-after-indias-
asat-test/ [https://perma.cc/Z9GT-5TJV] (quoting John Hyten).
11 Aziz Haniffa, State Department Tries to Minimize Impact of NASA Comment on
India’s Anti-Satellite Test, INDIA ABROAD (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.indiaabroad.
com/india/state-department-tries-to-minimize-impact-of-nasa-comment-on/arti-
cle_c651a31e-572a-11e9-b843-9beec63ea816.html [https://perma.cc/26L3-
SSD9] (quoting Jim Bridenstine).
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people.”12 The United States, if “savvy,” can seize upon senti-
ments such as these and coordinate a response.13
If the Indian ASAT test provides a catalyst for finding a multi-
lateral solution to the problem of long-lasting orbital debris,
then the question is how to go about achieving it. Declaring uni-
lateral moratoriums, establishing non-binding norms of behav-
ior, negotiating new binding treaties—there are many avenues
the United States may pursue to address the hazards and secur-
ity risks posed by debris-producing events. Why not explore us-
ing a tool seemingly few have thought to use—the international
space law we already have?
Article IX calls for States to conduct their outer space activi-
ties with due regard for the corresponding interests of other
States.14 Effectively ignored throughout its history, Article IX’s
due regard principle has untapped potential to contribute to a
safe and secure outer space environment. New technologies and
changing circumstances can challenge existing law, requiring
the law to adapt and evolve to remain relevant. The leading state
actors in space can, through their statements, actions, and lead-
ership, shape the meaning and substance of international law
provisions. Hence, with concerted and coordinated effort, it
may be possible for the United States to lead in shaping an inter-
pretation of the due regard principle into a tool capable of ad-
dressing debris-generating events. This Article examines the
potential of the due regard principle, the possibility of establish-
ing a functional meaning, and some considerations involved in
pursuing such a course of action.
II. THE DUE REGARD PRINCIPLE
A. ARTICLE IX OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY
The due regard principle is expressed in the first sentence of
Article IX that all spacefaring States signed. It states:
In the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon
and other celestial bodies, States Parties to the Treaty shall be
12 Id.
13 See Frank A. Rose, India’s Anti-Satellite Test Presents a Window of Opportunity for




14 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. IX,
Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
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guided by the principle of co-operation and mutual assistance
and shall conduct all their activities in outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard to the corre-
sponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty.15
Article IX goes on to state:
States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct ex-
ploration of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination and
also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth resulting
from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and, where nec-
essary, shall adopt appropriate measures for this purpose. If a
State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or
experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space, includ-
ing the moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially
harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in the
peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the moon
and other celestial bodies, it shall undertake appropriate interna-
tional consultations before proceeding with any such activity or
experiment. A State Party to the Treaty which has reason to be-
lieve that an activity or experiment planned by another State
Party in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bod-
ies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities in
the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, may request consultation con-
cerning the activity or experiment.16
In summary, Article IX begins with the obligation of States to
conduct their space activities “with due regard to the corre-
sponding interests of all other [States].” It builds upon this obli-
gation with three additional obligations: to avoid harmful
contamination of outer space, to avoid adverse changes in the
Earth environment due to the introduction of extraterrestrial
matter, and to undertake appropriate international consulta-
tions if a State has reason to believe its space activities would
cause potentially harmful interference to the space activities of
other States.
Analysis of the duties within Article IX often focuses on these
three additional obligations to the exclusion of the broader due
regard principle.17 Carl Christol identified as a commonly held
“premise” of Article IX the notion that it “was designed to pre-
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 See, e.g., Michael C. Mineiro, FY-1C and USA-193 ASAT Intercepts: An Assess-
ment of Legal Obligations Under Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, 34 J. SPACE L. 321
(2008) (the author applied the facts of ASAT test cases to the three additional
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vent a launching State from knowingly introducing into the
space environment without prior consultations with other States
materials which in their original condition . . . could produce a
potentially harmful interference in the space activities of other
States.”18 However commonly held it might be, this narrow inter-
pretation does not reflect the broader implications of the obli-
gation to conduct space activities with due regard to the
corresponding interests of other States. It does, however,
demonstrate how Article IX’s due regard principle is often over-
looked, even in discussions specifically about Article IX obliga-
tions. Nevertheless, assessing compliance under Article IX
requires more than just considering whether consultations over
harmful interference are required, or whether harmful contami-
nation is avoided. Compliance also requires space activities to be
conducted with due regard to the corresponding interests of
other States; this obligation is independent of the three subsidi-
ary obligations and must be assessed on its own merits.
B. DUE REGARD ON THE HIGH SEAS
The high seas offer a useful lens to view the development of
the due regard principle. Historically, areas outside the territo-
rial sovereignty of any State, such as the high seas, were gener-
ally recognized as places where sovereign rights could be
exercised unimpeded.19 For instance, just under a century ago
the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) observed,
“[V]essels on the high seas are subject to no authority except
that of the State whose flag they fly.”20 This sentiment reflected a
judicial view of the high seas that has been characterized “as one
in which states may fully exercise their customary freedom as
sovereigns.”21 In other words, vessels on the high seas did not
have to act with due regard to the rights of other vessels.
obligations under Article IX, but did not treat the due regard principle as a dis-
tinct stand-alone obligation).
18 CARL Q. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 792
(1982).
19 The concept of mare liberum, or freedom of the high seas, dates back to
Hugo Grotius’s eponymous pamphlet, published anonymously in 1609. See gener-
ally HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREE SEA (David Armitage ed., Richard Hakluyt trans.,
2004).
20 S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 25
(Sept. 7).
21 Brian McGarry, The Development of Custom in Territorial Dispute Settlement, 8 J.
INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 339, 356 (2017).
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By 1956, a more nuanced view had emerged. That year, the
United Nations’ International Law Commission (ILC) recom-
mended states adopt the position that “States are bound to re-
frain from any acts which might adversely affect the use of the
high seas by nationals of other States.”22 States did exactly that
in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas.23 For exam-
ple, Article 2 stated, “These freedoms, and others which are rec-
ognized by the general principles of international law, shall be
exercised by all States with reasonable regard to the interests of
other States in their exercise of freedom of the high seas.”24 In
the 1974 Fisheries Jurisdiction case, the International Court of Jus-
tice (ICJ) indicated “reasonable regard” as used in Article 2 and
“due regard” are equivalent concepts.25 Moreover, the ICJ in
Fisheries Jurisdiction validated the emergence of the due regard
principle, observing that:
[O]ne of the advances in maritime international law, resulting
from the intensification of fishing, that the former laissez-faire
treatment of the living resources of the sea in the high seas has
been replaced by a recognition of a duty to have due regard to
the rights of other States and the needs of conservation for the
benefit of all.26
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) makes numerous references to due regard and rea-
sonable regard.27 Article 87 provides a non-exhaustive list of
freedoms, declaring they “shall be exercised by all States with
due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of
the freedom of the high seas, and also with due regard for the
rights under this Convention with respect to activities in the
Area.”28 Article 147, paragraph 1, declares, “Activities in the
22 Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR
Supp. No. 9, at ch. II, § 3, art. 27, U.N. Doc A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 278, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.1.
23 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450
U.N.T.S. 82.
24 Id. art. 2.
25 See Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 68 (July
25) (“[T]he principle of reasonable regard for the interests of other States en-
shrined in Article 2 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas of 1958 requires
Iceland and the United Kingdom to have due regard to each other’s interests,
and to the interests of other States, in those resources.”).
26 Id. ¶ 72.
27 See U. N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter Law of the Sea Convention].
28 Id. art. 87.
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Area shall be carried out with reasonable regard for other activi-
ties in the marine environment.”29 Paragraph 3 declares, “Other
activities in the marine environment shall be conducted with
reasonable regard for activities in the Area.”30 Echoing the Fish-
eries Jurisdiction case, “reasonable regard” and “due regard” can
be assumed to be equivalent in UNCLOS.31
In addition, Articles 56 and 58 address the coexistence of the
rights of coastal States and the freedom of other States within
exclusive economic zones. Article 56(2) declares: “In exercising
its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in the
exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have due regard
to the rights and duties of other States and shall act in a manner
compatible with the provisions of this Convention.”32 Article
58(3) declares:
In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this
Convention in the exclusive economic zone, States shall have due
regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State and shall com-
ply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State in
accordance with the provisions of this Convention and other
rules of international law in so far as they are not incompatible
with this Part.33
Due regard in the international law of the sea is inherently
reciprocal. As Tullio Treves explains, “[W]hen the coexistence
or competition between two equally legitimate activities is envis-
aged, the obligation of ‘due regard’ is always reciprocal.”34 Con-
sequently, one legitimate activity cannot be prioritized over
another legitimate activity.35 Instead, in a competition between
legitimate activities, priority must be assessed, taking into ac-
count the importance of each activity and the extent of the an-
ticipated impairment that one activity might subject upon
another.36 As the Permanent Court of Arbitration observed in
the Chagos Marine Protected Area case between the United King-
dom (U.K.) and Mauritius, “In the majority of cases, this assess-
29 Id. art. 147(1).
30 Id. art. 147(3).
31 Tullio Treves, ‘Due Regard’ Obligations Under the 1982 UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea: The Laying of Cables and Activities in the Area, 34 INT’L J. MARINE &
COASTAL L. 167, 170 (2019).
32 Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 27, art. 56(2).
33 Id. art. 58(3).
34 Treves, supra note 31, at 184.
35 See id. at 185.
36 See Chagos Marine Protected Area (Mauritius v. U.K.), 31 R.I.A.A. 359, 571
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015).
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ment will necessarily involve at least some consultation with the
rights-holding State.”37
Hence, the modern international law of the sea depends on
the due regard principle “for ensuring coexistence between
equally legitimate activities in a given maritime area.”38 As de-
scribed below, the due regard principle is intended to play a
similar role when applied to outer space, but in practice it has
not realized its potential.
C. THE APPLICATION OF DUE REGARD TO OUTER SPACE
Article IX’s due regard principle establishes an obligation
upon signatories of the Outer Space Treaty to take the rights of
other signatory States into account when exercising their own
rights. As the Chairman of the Legal Subcommittee of the
United Nations (UN) Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space (COPUOS) during the negotiation of the Outer Space
Treaty, Manfred Lachs, wrote, “These interests are consequent
upon the recognition of the rights of other States and are to be
construed on a basis of a reasonable interpretation of those
rights. They constitute the limits of the freedom of action of
States in outer space.”39 Accordingly, the due regard principle
simultaneously limits and protects a State’s freedom of action in
space. In other words, you may not encroach upon the freedoms
of others, just as others may not encroach upon your freedoms.
The application of the due regard principle to debris-creating
activities is therefore a balancing of the countervailing rights of
States. Take, for example, kinetic ASAT tests. Nothing in the
Outer Space Treaty specifically prohibits ASAT tests.40 Moreo-
ver, the right to use and explore outer space freely—to include
the use of space to conduct ASAT tests—is protected under Arti-
cle I of the Outer Space Treaty.41 However, one likely outcome
of a kinetic ASAT test is the creation of debris. This creation of
long-lasting debris in a crowded orbit will affect the freedom of
all States to use that orbit. Depending on its altitude, debris can
remain in orbit for many years, risking damage or destruction of
37 Id. at 571–72.
38 Treves, supra note 31, at 167–68.
39 MANFRED LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE: AN EXPERIENCE IN CONTEMPO-
RARY LAW MAKING 43 (Tanja Masson-Zwann & Stephan Hobe eds., Martinus
Nijhoff 2010) (1972).
40 See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 14.
41 Id. art. I.
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satellites.42 Debris also places astronauts at risk.43 As NASA Ad-
ministrator Jim Bridenstine stated in the aftermath of India’s
ASAT test, “That kind of activity is not compatible with the fu-
ture of human spaceflight.”44 It is also not compatible with the
proliferation of commercial space activity, all of which is legally
regarded as national activity pursuant to Article VI of the Outer
Space Treaty.45 Hence, the freedom to litter orbits with space
debris must be weighed against the effect those actions have on
the ability of other States to use the same orbits, as is their right
to do. Importantly, the calculus changes as space activities in-
crease. What may once have been acceptable may now be unac-
ceptable. As Bridenstine observed, “[C]reating debris fields
intentionally is wrong . . . the entire world [has to] step up and
say, if you’re going to do this, you’re going to pay a conse-
quence—and right now that consequence is not being paid.”46
Although Manfred Lachs tells us the due regard principle rec-
ognizes the limits of freedom of action in outer space,47 in prac-
tice it is not all clear where those limits lie. The due regard
principle, simply put, does not guide the conduct of States. This
is unsurprising because “[i]f a treaty is to be regarded as creat-
ing ‘hard’ obligations, i.e., possessing some autonomous bind-
ing norms, it must be precisely worded and specify the exact
obligations undertaken by signatory states.”48 The Outer Space
Treaty does not define “due regard,” and Article IX is not pre-
cisely worded.49 Moreover, States have yet to establish a clear
interpretation for the treaty language. Consequently, the princi-
ple’s vagueness hinders its ability to serve as a guide to behavior.
42 Emily Kwong, Space Junk: How Cluttered is the Final Frontier?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(Jan. 13, 2020), npr.org/2020/01/10/795246131/space-junk-how-cluttered-is-
the-final-frontier [https://perma.cc/33FC-W364].
43 Id.
44 Marcia Smith, Bridenstine Talks Moon by 2024, Slams Indian ASAT Test, SPACE
POL’Y ONLINE (Apr. 1, 2019, 10:52 PM), https://spacepolicyonline.com/news/
bridenstine-talks-moon-by-2024-slams-indian-asat-test/ [https://perma.cc/BPA8-
NLTS] (quoting Jim Bridenstine).
45 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 14, art. VI.
46 Sarah Lewin, India’s Anti-Satellite Test Created Dangerous Debris, NASA Says,
SPACE.COM (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.space.com/nasa-chief-condemns-india-
anti-satellite-test.html [https://perma.cc/A4ZS-YTL6] (quoting Jim Bridenstine).
47 LACHS, supra note 39, at 43.
48 David Tan, Towards a New Regime for the Protection of Outer Space as the “Province
of All Mankind,” 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 145, 165 (2000).
49 See N. Jasentuliyana, Space Debris and International Law, 26 J. SPACE L. 139,
140–41 (1998) (“[T]he provisions of Article IX, like many other parts of the
Outer Space Treaty, are by their nature not precise.”).
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As currently interpreted by States, the due regard principle im-
poses no cost and provides no benefit. States do not know what
they are obligated to do or not to do in order to comply with
Article IX’s due regard principle.
China’s 2007 ASAT test is instructive for assessing how States
have applied—or, more accurately, not applied—the due re-
gard principle to promote responsible behavior in space. On
January 11, 2007, China conducted a kinetic ASAT test with a
modified ballistic missile, destroying its own defunct Fengyun
weather satellite.50 The test was the single worst debris-related
contamination incident to date involving a human space object,
littering low earth orbit with nearly 3,400 pieces of trackable
debris51 and an estimated 150,000 pieces of untrackable deb-
ris.52 At an altitude of around 850 kilometers (530 miles) upon
impact, much of this debris will remain in LEO for decades.53
China’s ASAT test drew widespread condemnation.54 How-
ever, almost none of the criticism came in the form of a legal
objection. Japan was the only nation to accuse China of acting
illegally, but did not specify the basis for its allegation other
than to say it was a violation of the Outer Space Treaty.55 A Brit-
ish spokesperson expressed the prevailing view that the test was
lamentable, but not unlawful, stating:
We are concerned about the impact of debris in space and we
expressed that concern . . . We don’t believe that this does con-
travene international law. What we are concerned about however
is lack of consultation and we believe that this development of
this technology and the manner in which this test was conducted
is inconsistent with the spirit of China’s statements to the UN
and other bodies on the military use of space.56
50 C. Stokely & M. Matney, Haystack Radar Observations of Debris From the Fengyun-
1C Antisatellite Test, 12 NASA ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS 1, 7 (July 2008), https://
orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/quarterly-news/pdfs/odqnv12i3.pdf [https:perma.cc/
V5TF-GRG4].
51 NASA Orbital Debris Program Office, Fengyun-1C Debris Cloud Remains Haz-
ardous, 18 NASA ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS 1, 2 (Jan. 2014), https://
orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/quarterly-news/pdfs/odqnv18i1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/V5L3-7DF4].
52 Stokely & Matney, supra note 50, at 8.
53 Id. at 7.
54 See supra Part I.
55 JAMES CLAY MOLTZ, ASIA’S SPACE RACE: NATIONAL MOTIVATIONS, REGIONAL
RIVALRIES, AND INTERNATIONAL RISKS 64–65 (2012).
56 Richard Spencer, Chinese Missile Destroys Satellite in Space, THE TELEGRAPH
(Jan. 19, 2007, 2:17 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
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As the Chinese ASAT test illustrates, the due regard principle
did nothing to regulate behavior in 2007, even when it came to
the intentional creation of long-lasting, harmful debris. The le-
gal landscape had not changed by the time India conducted a
(much less) destructive test of its own in 2019, despite the con-
tinual growth in the use of outer space and in the importance of
space applications. Notably, in the days following India’s test,
the German delegation at the meeting in Vienna of the Legal
Subcommittee of COPUOS called for a legally binding ban on
the intentional destruction of space objects resulting in the gen-
eration of long-lasting debris.57 This was an implicit admission
that no international space law—and certainly not the due re-
gard principle—currently provides such a prohibition.
Although it is a legally binding principle (at least, as a matter
of treaty law), the due regard principle in Article IX is vague,
weak, and has yet to achieve an accepted interpretation that
would enable it to be applied in practice. It is, therefore, failing
to live up to its potential as a guide for lawful conduct. It does
not have to remain this way. Even though States have not used
the due regard principle in the past as a tool to regulate respon-
sible behavior in space, that does not prevent the principle from
being interpreted in a way that might be useful in the future. As
in other domains, existing legal principles must evolve and
adapt to new technologies and circumstances. The increasingly
congested outer space environment provides an opportunity for
the due regard principle to fulfill its promise.
III. ESTABLISHING MEANING THROUGH STATE
PRACTICE
The practice of States plays a significant role in establishing
the meaning, or accepted interpretation, of international trea-
ties. According to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (VCLT), when the meaning of treaty provisions
is ambiguous or obscure, “[r]ecourse may be had to supplemen-
tary means of interpretation.”58 Supplementary means of inter-
1539948/Chinese-missile-destroys-satellite-in-space.html [https://perma.cc/
HSQ6-9L8S].
57 German Delegation, Statement on Space Debris at the 58th Session of the
UN Space Legal Subcommittee (Apr. 1–12, 2019), available at https://wien-
io.diplo.de/iow-en/news/statement-debris/2208724 [https://perma.cc/6AZQ-
ERY5].
58 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]. The United States has not ratified the VCLT,
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pretation under Article 32 include “subsequent practice in the
application of the treaty,” according to the 2018 report of the
International Law Commission (ILC).59 A subsequent practice
that serves as a supplementary means of interpretation under
Article 32 “consists of conduct by one or more parties in the
application of the treaty, after its conclusion.”60 According to
the ILC’s commentary to the 2018 draft conclusions, this form
of subsequent practice “does not require the agreement of all
the parties” and “any practice in the application of the treaty
that may provide indications as to how the treaty is to be inter-
preted may be a relevant supplementary means of interpreta-
tion.”61 Moreover, subsequent practice “may consist of any
conduct of a party in the application of a treaty, whether in the
exercise of its executive, legislative, judicial, or other func-
tions.”62 This “may include official statements concerning the
treaty’s meaning, protests against non-performance or tacit ac-
ceptance of statements or acts by other parties,” according to
the ILC’s commentary.63
Because the meaning is obscure, Article IX’s due regard prin-
ciple requires subsequent State practice in the application of the
treaty as a supplemental means of interpretation, as contem-
plated under Article 32 of the VCLT. The ILC has concluded
that subsequent practice under Article 32 “may contribute to
the clarification of the meaning of a treaty” and the effect of
subsequent practice in the application of a treaty does not
amend or modify a treaty, but merely intends to interpret it.64
The due regard principle is not in need of a modification, be-
cause there has never been a widely-accepted meaning to be
modified. Rather, the due regard principle is in need of subse-
but it considers many of its provisions “to constitute customary international law
on the law of treaties.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm [https://
perma.cc/CC6P-T8LL] (last updated Jan. 20. 2017).
59 Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Seventieth Sess., at 17, ¶ 4, U.N.
Doc A/73/10 (2018) available at https://undocs.org/en/A/73/10 [https://
perma.cc/HE2Y-ZVA2] [hereinafter ILC Report].
60 Id. at 27, ¶ 13. This is to be distinguished from subsequent practice as an
authentic means of interpretation under VCLT article 31(b)(3), which, accord-
ing to the ILC Report, “consists of conduct in the application of a treaty, after its
conclusion, which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding the inter-
pretation of the treaty.” Id.
61 Id. at 33, ¶¶ 23–24.
62 Id. at 37, ¶ 35.
63 Id. at 36–37, ¶ 35.
64 Id. at 51, ¶ 1.
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quent practice to assign a functional meaning, thereby revealing
its potential.
This interpretive approach has been called evolutive interpre-
tation. In this approach, “the idea is that a treaty provision,
when adopted, might be open-textured, with the parties in-
tending that it would cover certain future developments that
might not be known at the time.”65 According to the ILC, subse-
quent practice may, in part, also determine whether the parties
intended the meaning of a treaty provision to be capable of
evolving over time.66 Importantly, with regard to the possibility
for evolutive interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty, it is
worth recalling the words of Manfred Lachs:
These principles [of the Outer Space Treaty] may have been
couched in very general and broad terms . . . Be this as it may,
the provisions in question can hardly be regarded as nominal or
devoid of substantive meaning . . . It may have been premature to
enter into any more detailed specification of them or of the cor-
responding obligations. But the need for this will grow in con-
frontation with practice, while adequate interpretation will be
called for in concrete situations.67
Indeed, as Lachs makes clear, evolution was part of the design
when negotiating the Outer Space Treaty.68 Dembling and Ar-
ons echo this sentiment in their contemporaneous account of
the Treaty’s negotiation, concluding, “In establishing certain
general principles, the Treaty leaves much to interpretation by
the parties.”69 To paraphrase Lachs, the need for an “adequate
interpretation” of the obligations of the due regard principle is
now “called for in concrete situations.”70 The call grows more
urgent as the space environment becomes increasingly con-
gested with satellites. The time is ripe for a specific interpreta-
tion of the due regard principle.
Updating treaty interpretation through State practice is a
practical endeavor and may, in some circumstances, be prefera-
ble to the creation of new laws. As one commentator has ob-
65 Sean D. Murphy, The Relevance of Subsequent Agreement and Subsequent Practice
for the Interpretation of Treaties, in TREATIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE 82, 86 (Ge-
org Nolte, ed., 2013).
66 ILC Report, supra note 59, at 6, ¶¶ 14–15.
67 LACHS, supra note 39, at 108.
68 Id.
69 Paul G. Dembling & Daniel M. Arons, The Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty,
33 J. AIR L. & COM. 419, 456 (1967).
70 LACHS, supra note 39, at 108.
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served, “[A]mending the language of international treaties
might be cumbersome or impossible, but some degree of vague-
ness and ambiguity in treaty language can permit shared inter-
pretations to be modified over time, thus providing the
community of states with a relatively simple ‘backdoor’ means of
changing the effect of a treaty.”71 “Treaties are cumbersome de-
vices that cannot change quickly, and thus may be become in-
creasingly less responsive to complex realities,” according to
another commentator.72 In general, treaties from the previous
century may be “showing their age, and hence we may be enter-
ing a period when greater flexibility in treaty interpretation is
needed.”73 Additionally, “[s]tate practice reduces the transac-
tion costs associated with the development and operation of
treaties.”74 These are particularly important considerations
when it comes to international space law, where the transaction
costs for new law have become insurmountably high.
The last of the five international space law treaties negotiated
within COPUOS was the Moon Agreement, opened for signa-
ture in 1979.75 Since then, the treaty-making phase has given
way to efforts in COPUOS to negotiate non-binding resolutions
or focus on broadening the acceptance of the existing space law
treaties.76 In 1999, COPUOS sought to regain relevance by over-
hauling its agenda structure in order to encourage taking on
new agenda items without States having to worry that the items
would either languish forever or become law.77 Despite these
changes, the former Chairman of the COPUOS Legal Subcom-
71 Rosa Brooks, Rule of Law in the Gray Zone, MOD. WAR INST. WEST POINT (July
2, 2018), https://mwi.usma.edu/rule-law-gray-zone/ [https://perma.cc/FR3A-
7DEE].
72 Murphy, supra note 65, at 87.
73 Id.
74 William J. Aceves, The Economic Analysis of International Law: Transaction Cost
Economics and the Concept of State Practice, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 995, 1056
(1996).
75 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celes-
tial Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3.
76 Kai-Uwe Schrogl, A New Impetus for Space Law Making: The 1999 Reform of
UNCOPUOS and How It Works, 43 PROC. ON L. OUTER SPACE 96, 97–98 (2000).
77 Id. Results have included resolutions designed to clarify how best to apply
the concept of “launching State” as expressed in the Registration Convention and
the Liability Convention, and how to encourage States to comply with their obli-
gation to register their space objects. See G.A. Res. 59/115, Application of the
Concept of the “Launching State” (Dec. 10, 2004); see also G.A. Res. 62/101, Rec-
ommendations on Enhancing the Practice of States and International Intergov-
ernmental Organizations in Registering Space Objects (Dec. 17, 2007).
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mittee lamented as recently as 2014 that COPUOS was no closer
to regaining its former position at the forefront of developing
space law.78 Calls for new space law must recognize that the Le-
gal Subcommittee remains stuck in a “difficult period, character-
ized by the understanding for the need of change but no
emerging consensus on how to accomplish this.”79 COPUOS
member states have not been able to agree to pursue new bind-
ing space treaties for decades, and that does not appear likely to
change anytime soon.
Because the transaction costs of developing new space law
within COPUOS are prohibitive, it might be reasonable to as-
sume that the pursuit of non-legally binding agreements outside
of COPUOS would fare better. However, the failed draft Inter-
national Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (ICOC) ex-
emplifies the challenges of this alternative approach. In 2008,
the European Union (EU) published a draft Code of Conduct
for Outer Space Activities.80 As the effort gained support among
other nations, including the United States, the EU Code of Con-
duct became the basis for what would be known as the ICOC.81
After several years and multiple rounds of consultation, the EU
arranged a multilateral negotiation in New York in 2015.82 On
the first day, progress came to a grinding halt.83 States disputed
whether an EU-arranged meeting was the appropriate forum to
discuss space norms, as opposed to COPUOS or another UN
committee like the Conference on Disarmament.84 The lack of a
familiar forum contributed to further disagreement over the
proper rules of procedure.85 These procedural disputes “re-
78 Kai-Uwe Schrogl, The New Debate on the Working Methods of the UNCOPUOS
Legal Subcommittee, 105 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 101, 102 (2014), available at https://
www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0094576514002896 [https://
perma.cc/2GMR-H3GB].
79 Id. at 104.
80 Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 10 from Michael Zenko on A Code of
Conduct for Outer Space, Council on Foreign Rel. (Nov. 30, 2011), https://
www.cfr.org/report/code-conduct-outer-space [https://perma.cc/FW6K-GF2G].
81 Lisa Daniel, Defense, State Agree to Pursue Conduct Code for Outer Space, AM.
FORCES PRESS SERV. (Jan. 18, 2012), https://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarti-
cle.aspx?id=66833 [https://perma.cc/Q3S3-8744].
82 P.J. Blount, Sorting Out Self-Defence in Space: Understanding the Conflicting Views
on Self-Defence in the EU Code of Conduct, in MONOGRAPH SERIES V: CONFLICTS IN
SPACE AND THE RULE OF LAW 311 (Maria Manoli & Sandy Belle Habchi eds.,
2017).
83 Id. at 320.
84 Id.
85 Id.
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sulted in immediate deadlock on the first day of the Multilateral
Negotiations due to a palpable unwillingness to go forward on
the part of a number of States.”86 Ultimately, there were more
than just procedural disputes to blame for the demise of the
ICOC, and the fruitless negotiation in New York proved to be
the ICOC’s high water mark.87 The effort has been effectively
abandoned with no indications of a revival.
Even with COPUOS’s recent success in negotiating space sus-
tainability guidelines, the challenge of developing new instru-
ments remains evident. In June 2019, COPUOS adopted a
preamble and twenty-one guidelines for the long-term sus-
tainability of outer space.88 The result of a nine-year effort by
the Long Term Sustainability (LTS) Working Group, the LTS
guidelines do not address debris creation other than to en-
courage States to implement space debris mitigation mea-
sures—such as those adopted by COPUOS in 2007—within
national regulatory frameworks.89 Those voluntary debris mitiga-
tion guidelines call upon States to avoid the intentional destruc-
tion of on-orbit space objects or other harmful activities that
might create long-lived debris.90 The Chair of the LTS Working
Group hailed the achievement as “a historic moment for the
Committee” and “a significant step forward for ensuring the
long-term sustainability of space activities.”91 The Chair of the
Sixty-Second Session of COPUOS called it “probably the most
86 Id. at 321.
87 The ICOC was also hampered by a consultation process that left some coun-
tries feeling excluded, and a lack of support from Russia and China, which pre-
ferred their own joint draft Prevention on the Placement of Weapons in Outer
Space Treaty (PPWT). See Frank A. Rose, Safeguarding the Heavens: The United
States and the Future of Norms of Behavior in Outer Space, at 5 (Brookings Inst. Policy
Brief, 2018), available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/
06/FP_20180614_safeguarding_the_heavens.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EKN-
E5E2].
88 Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-
Second Session, at 54–69, U.N. Doc A/74/20 (2019) [hereinafter LTS
Guidelines].
89 Id.; see also Peter Martinez, The UN COPUOS Guidelines for the Long-Term Sus-
tainability of Outer Space Activities, SECURE WORLD FOUND. (Nov. 2019), https://
swfound.org/media/206891/swf_un_copuos_lts_guidelines_fact_sheet_novem-
ber-2019-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/PN62-APRC].
90 LTS Guidelines, supra note 88, at 54.
91 Press Release, Comm. on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Guidelines for the
Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities of the Committee on Peaceful
Used of Outer Space Adopted, U.N. Press Release UNIS/OS/518 (June 22,
2019), https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/informationfor/media/2019-unis-os-
518.html [https://perma.cc/NJV9-F2AF] (quoting Peter Martinez).
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significant achievement of COPUOS in a decade.”92 The LTS
guidelines are noteworthy in part because they represent a rare
tangible achievement for COPUOS. Nevertheless, acclaim for
this hard-fought achievement must be tempered with the ac-
knowledgment that the guidelines are non-binding, took nearly
a decade to produce, and are “largely codifying behaviors al-
ready implemented by spacefaring nations.”93 The LTS guide-
lines demonstrate that international transaction costs may be
overcome, but they are still significant, even for non-binding
instruments.
The transaction costs of negotiating new instruments can be
domestic as well as international in scope. Even non-binding in-
ternational space instruments can pose sizable challenges do-
mestically, as the United States learned from the ICOC.94 As
noted above, the ICOC was an attempt at a non-legally binding
political agreement. As such, the U.S. Congress had no formal
role in approving it, as it might have had for a new legally-bind-
ing international agreement.95 However, that did not stop the
U.S. Congress from throwing up hurdles. In the National De-
fense Authorization Act of 2013 (NDAA), Congress passed a
provision seeking to limit the President’s ability to bypass Con-
gress. It stated:
SEC. 913. Limitation on International Agreements Concerning
Outer Space Activities.
(a) CERTIFICATION REQUIRED.—If the United States be-
comes a signatory to a non-legally binding international agree-
ment concerning an International Code of Conduct for Outer
Space Activities or any similar agreement, at the same time as the
United States becomes such signatory—
(1) the President shall submit to the congressional defense
committees, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of
the House of Representatives, and the Select Committee on In-
telligence of the Senate a certification that such agreement has
no legally-binding effect or basis for limiting the activities of the
United States in outer space; and
92 Id. (quoting Andre Rypl).
93 Audrey M. Schaffer, The Role of Space Norms in Protection and Defense, 87 JOINT
FORCE Q. 88, 90 (2017).
94 See John S. Goehring, Real-World Lessons on Achievable Space Governance From
the International Code of Conduct For Outer Space Activities, the Iran Nuclear Agreement,
and the Paris Climate Agreement, in MONOGRAPH SERIES V: CONFLICT AND THE RULE
OF LAW 381, 388 (Maria Manoli & Sandy Belle Habchi eds., 2017).
95 Id. at 391.
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(2) the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and the Director of National Intelligence shall jointly
submit to the congressional defense committees a certification
that such agreement will be equitable, enhance national security,
and have no militarily significant impact on the ability of the
United States to conduct military or intelligence activities in
space.96
Ultimately, the demise of the ICOC in the negotiation stage
meant that no certifications to Congress were ever needed.
However, these NDAA provisions made the executive branch’s
pursuit of non-binding rules significantly harder than was likely
anticipated.
Whether through a legally binding or non-legally binding in-
strument, establishing new rules and norms for space activities
out of whole cloth involves significant transaction costs, both do-
mestically and within international fora. Given these costs, inter-
preting the law we already have in order to address the growing
threat of orbital debris presents a credible alternative.
IV. PAST U.S. EFFORTS TO SHAPE INTERPRETATIONS
IN SPACE LAW
Interpreting the meaning of legal principles to accommodate
national interests in outer space may sound unrealistic to some,
but in fact the United States has embarked on this process
before: the successful U.S. effort to shape the meaning of
“peaceful purposes,” and the more recent domestic law develop-
ments influencing the interpretation of the non-appropriation
principle as it relates to space resources.
A. PEACEFUL PURPOSES
The notion that space is to be used for peaceful purposes pre-
dates the Outer Space Treaty. In 1961, the UN passed a non-
legally binding resolution entitled International Co-Operation in
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the very title of which suggested
space should be for peaceful uses.97 This was followed in 1963 by
the non-legally binding Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (1963
Declaration), which would be the precursor to the 1967 Outer
96 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-
239, 126 Stat. 1632, § 913 (2013).
97 G.A. Res. 1721 (XVI), International Co-Operation in the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space (Dec. 20, 1961).
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Space Treaty.98 The 1963 Declaration recognized “the common
interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and
use of outer space for peaceful purposes.”99 As early as 1962, as
it prepared for the upcoming UN negotiations for the non-bind-
ing 1963 Declaration, the United States recognized that use of
the term “peaceful purposes” would become a point of conten-
tion as States negotiated the principles that would govern the
space domain. Mindful of the value of its military use of space
for reconnaissance purposes, the United States set out to proac-
tively shape the interpretation of “peaceful purposes.”
In May 1962, President Kennedy directed the creation of a
committee for the purpose of “formulating a position which
avoids the dangers of restricting ourselves, compromising highly
classified programs, or providing assistance of significant mili-
tary value to the Soviet Union and which at the same time per-
mits us to continue to work for disarmament and international
cooperation in space.”100 The resulting committee, called the
Committee on Satellite Reconnaissance Policy, identified the
need to mitigate against confusion over the legality of using
space for military purposes.101 It acknowledged that “other gov-
ernments and peoples are in varying degrees of ignorance
about” the United States’ military satellite reconnaissance pro-
gram.102 The Committee recognized there are “confused views”
outside of the United States about the “distinction between
‘peaceful,’ ‘military,’ ‘non-prohibited,’ and ‘legal’ on the one
hand, and ‘aggressive,’ ‘civilian,’ ‘prohibited,’ and ‘illegal’ on
the other.”103 As an example, the Committee cited to the earlier
1961 resolution, a document which “may seem to many to mili-
tate against any ‘military’ use of space” because of the connota-
tions of the title, International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of
98 G.A. Res. 1962 (XVII), Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activi-
ties of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (Dec. 13, 1963).
99 Id.
100 National Security Action Memorandum No. 1561 (May 26, 1962), in FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961–1963, ORGANIZATION OF FOREIGN POLICY;
INFORMATION POLICY; UNITED NATIONS; SCIENTIFIC MATTERS, at Doc. 420 (Paul
Claussen et al. eds., 2001), available at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocu-
ments/frus1961-63v25/d420 [https://perma.cc/3CDD-XKUT].
101 Report by the Committee on Satellite Reconnaissance Policy (July 2, 1962), in FOR-
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Outer Space, notwithstanding that the connotations are “distin-
guish[able] from its actual operative provisions.”104
In short, it appeared as though other States could begin to
associate “peaceful” with “non-military,” and “military” with “ag-
gressive.” That was a problem for the United States. In its report,
the Committee expressed the policy concern as follows:
Arguments have been advanced, on the premise that a reconnais-
sance satellite program is a “military” (as opposed to “peaceful”)
program, that the use of such satellites in outer space is an ag-
gressive act and thus a violation of international law. The confu-
sions over legality, propriety and peacefulness earlier noted can
be exploited for use against space reconnaissance. Thus it could
be argued, with considerable appeal, that the military uses of
outer space, such as satellite reconnaissance, should be pro-
scribed as non-peaceful.105
Accordingly, the Committee advised: “The US should therefore
continue to avoid any position implying that reconnaissance ac-
tivities in outer space are not legitimate. Similarly, we should
avoid any position declaring or implying that such activities are
not ‘peaceful uses.’”106 In response, President Kennedy directed
the State Department to negotiate at the upcoming COPUOS
deliberations with a particular objective: “To show that the dis-
tinction between peaceful and aggressive uses of outer space is
not the same as the distinction between military and civilian
uses, and that U.S. aims to keep space free from aggressive use
and offers cooperation in its peaceful exploitation for scientific
and technical purposes.”107
Hence, as early as August 1962, the official U.S. position from
the top down was to embrace the notion of “peaceful use” of
space while making a coordinated effort to define “peaceful” as
“non-aggressive” rather than “non-military.” On December 3,
1962, the U.S. representative to the First Committee of the
United Nations, Senator Albert Gore, expressed this position in




107 National Security Action Memorandum No. 183 (Aug. 27, 1962), in FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961–1963, supra note 100, at Doc. 425, availa-
ble at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v25/d425
[https://perma.cc/KFW9-QB8R].
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should only be used for peaceful—that is, non-aggressive and
beneficial—purposes.”108
According to Bin Cheng, the United States was “trying hard to
attribute an entirely new meaning of the word ‘peaceful’ . . . a
bold attempt to bypass and circumvent the then still prevalent
attitude that all military activities should be banned from outer
space.”109 Though such an attitude may have been prevalent, in
fact space has been used for military reconnaissance since the
dawn of the space age,110 which is why the United States sought
to counter interpretations that would have suggested otherwise.
In this the United States has largely succeeded. The view “which
today has gained general acceptance, is that nonaggressive mili-
tary uses are peaceful.”111 Nevertheless, “arguments still persist
as to whether [peaceful purposes] refers to ‘non-military’ or
‘non-aggressive.’”112 Accordingly, U.S. shaping efforts have
continued.
The United States has carried on methodically bolstering its
interpretation of “peaceful purposes,” reinforcing its meaning
as “non-aggressive.” For example, a series of national space poli-
cies have expressly stated that peaceful purposes allow for space
activities in pursuit of national security goals (1982 and 1989),
for “defense and intelligence-related activities in pursuit of na-
tional interests” (1996), for “U.S. defense and intelligence-re-
lated activities in pursuit of national interests” (2006), and “for
space to be used for national and homeland security activities”
(2010).113
108 Ernest L. Kerley et al., Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 57 AM. J. INT’L L. 403, 428 (1963).
109 Bin Cheng, Properly Speaking, Only Celestial Bodies Have Been Reserved for Use
Exclusively for Peaceful (Non-Military) Purposes, but Not Outer Void Space, 75 INT’L L.
STUD. 81, 86 (2000).
110 Report by the Committee on Satellite Reconnaissance Policy, supra note 101.
111 CHRISTOL, supra note 18, at 22; see also Dale Stephens, The International Legal
Implications of Military Space Operations: Examining the Interplay Between International
Humanitarian Law and the Outer Space Legal Regime, 94 INT’L L. STUD. 75, 81
(2018).
112 Steven Freeland, Peaceful Purposes? Governing the Military Uses of Outer Space,
18 EUR. J.L. REFORM 35, 42 (2016).
113 U.S. National Space Policy, National Security Decision Directive/NSDD-42
(July 4, 1982), available at https://fas.org/spp/military/docops/national/nsdd-
42.htm [https://perma.cc/LZP6-7FLT]; National Space Policy Directives and Ex-
ecutive Charter, National Security Presidential Directive No.1/NSPD-1 (Nov. 2,
1989), available at https://fas.org/spp/military/docops/national/nspd1.htm
[https://perma.cc/VCG9-J6JW]; U.S. National Space Policy, Presidential Deci-
sion Directive/NSC-49/NSTC-8 (Sept. 14, 1996), available at https://fas.org/
spp/military/docops/national/nstc-8.htm [https://perma.cc/YU4L-LX7H];
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B. SPACE RESOURCE MINING AND THE NON-APPROPRIATION
PRINCIPLE
While shaping the interpretation of “peaceful purposes” has
been ongoing since 1962, the issue of outer space resource min-
ing is a more recent example of this evolutionary process in ac-
tion. Technological developments have hastened the need for
clarity on the question of whether international law allows for
property interests in space. Article II of the Outer Space Treaty
declares that “[o]uter space, including the moon and other ce-
lestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim
of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other
means.”114 For decades, scholars have debated whether this non-
appropriation principle permits private actors to assert property
rights in resources harvested from the Moon or asteroids.115
“[T]he ability of a mining venture to lawfully extract mineral
resources [from a celestial body] remains somewhat uncertain,”
observes one scholar.116 In one view, “the commercial need
would necessitate the assertion of exclusivity” by investors, and
“it is generally considered that the existence of private [exclu-
sive] property rights requires the existence of state sovereignty,
which is expressly prohibited by Article II.”117 In addition, asser-
tions of private property rights in resources taken from celestial
bodies is seen as problematic by some who “argue that, since
U.S. National Space Policy, National Space Policy Directive/NSPD-49 (Aug. 31,
2006), available at https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/space.pdf [https://perma.
cc/W5VZ-BVPJ]; National Space Policy of the United States of America, Presiden-
tial Directive\PPD-4 (June 28, 2010), available at https://aerospace.org/sites/de-
fault/files/policy_archives/National%20Space%20Policy%2028Jun10.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8UAU-9CX4]. President Carter’s 1978 National Space Policy
also said, “ ‘Peaceful purposes’ allow for military and intelligence-related activities
in pursuit of national security and other goals,” but it was classified as confiden-
tial when issued, blunting its ability to shape international perspectives. U.S. Na-
tional Space Policy, Presidential Directive/PD/NSC-37 (May 11, 1978), available
at https://aerospace.org/sites/default/files/2019-02/PD-37%20National
%20Space%20Policy%2011May78.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TD3-GWLE].
114 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 14, art. II.
115 See, e.g., RICKY J. LEE, LAW AND REGULATION OF COMMERCIAL MINING OF MIN-
ERALS IN OUTER SPACE 182 (2012); Frans G. von der Dunk, Asteroid Mining: Inter-
national and National Legal Aspects, 26 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 83, 91 (2017); Brian
J. Egan, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dept. of State, Remarks at the Galloway Symposium
on Critical Issues in Space Law (Dec. 7, 2016), available at https://2009-
2017.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/264963.htm [https://perma.cc/WX4F-
KGK3].
116 LEE, supra note 115, at 182.
117 Id. at 199.
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outer space belongs to all of mankind, all natural resources
available also belong to all of mankind.”118
This is not the view of the United States. In 1979, Secretary of
State Cyrus Vance reflected the longstanding U.S. interpretation
when he explained to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
that the non-appropriation principle applies only to resources
“in place” and does not prevent ownership over resources which
have been removed from their place on or below the surface of
a celestial body.119 Decades later, as advances in technology
made a space resource mining industry increasingly plausible,
Congress sought to create a pro-industry legal environment for
potential investors. In 2015, the United States passed the Com-
mercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Title IV of which
was called the Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act
(the Act).120
The Act recognizes the right of citizens to assert private prop-
erty interests in space resources “in manners consistent with the
international obligations of the United States.”121 In doing so,
the Act proclaims it “does not thereby assert sovereignty or sov-
ereign or exclusive rights or jurisdiction over, or the ownership
of, any celestial body.”122 In effect, this provision states the
United States’ interpretation of the rights of Article I and the
bounds of Article II: the Outer Space Treaty prohibits assertions
of sovereignty over celestial bodies, but does not prohibit assert-
ing property rights in the resources on celestial bodies once re-
moved. Through the Act, Congress has, in effect, declared the
U.S. interpretation to be legitimate under international law.
Given that there is no accepted international interpretation
on this matter, the Act may be seen “as legislation that repre-
sents a step towards defining the content of Article II and the
118 von der Dunk, supra note 115, at 91. This argument is derived from Article I
of the Outer Space Treaty, which holds that the exploration and use of outer
space “shall be the province of all mankind.” Outer Space Treaty, supra note 14,
art. I.
119 See Egan, supra note 115 (describing Hearings on Agreement Governing the Ac-
tivities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies Before the S. Comm. on Commerce,
Sci. and Transp., 96th Cong. 312–13 (1980) (letter from Secretary of State Vance
to Senator Frank Church, from Nov. 28, 1979)).
120 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90,
§§ 401–403, 129 Stat. 704, 720–22 (2015) (codified at 51 U.S.C. § 51301–03).
121 Id. § 402.
122 Id. § 403.
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law concerning the specific activity of space mining.”123 The test
is whether the other States embrace this step and, ultimately,
establish something approximating an international consensus.
Luxembourg quickly provided the next step, enacting a law in
2017 declaring that space resources are capable of being appro-
priated.124 The United Arab Emirates is also preparing to estab-
lish domestic laws that would allow private companies to retain
ownership of resources mined in space.125 Due to U.S. and pri-
vate sector outreach, “[a] number of close allies that previously
held no opinion about the [U.S.] law, including Australia, Ca-
nada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, are now consider-
ing their own space resources policies.”126 China, too, has
reportedly dropped its initial opposition to the U.S. law, in part
because China also has plans for space resource utilization.127
Going forward, the United States must continue establishing a
pattern of clear state practice in furtherance of its application of
the Outer Space Treaty to resource mining on celestial bodies.
However, in doing so the United States must also be cognizant
that other States continue to have misgivings about this ap-
proach. For example, the Belgian delegation to COPUOS re-
cently lamented:
In the last decades, a lot of efforts have been devoted towards
adopting an interpretation of the United Nations space law trea-
ties that would, above all, advance national—and sometimes indi-
vidual—objectives or interests. Belgium fears that this evolution,
bolstered by national legislation in the face of a growing dead-
lock at intergovernmental forums, may result in growing misun-
123 P.J. Blount & Christian J. Robison, One Small Step: The Impact of the U.S. Com-
mercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015 on the Exploitation of Resources in
Outer Space, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 160, 182 (2016).
124 CODE CIVIL Loi du 20 Juillet 2017 sur L’exploration et L’utilisation des Res-
sources de L’espace, art. I (Lux.) (“Les ressources de l’espace sont susceptibles
d’appropriation.”), available at http://legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/loi/2017/
07/20/a674/jo [https://perma.cc/SP8R-Y3N5].
125 Kelsey Warner, UAE Looks to Regulate Asteroid Mining as It Aims to Lure Private
Space Sector, THE NATIONAL (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.thenational.ae/uae/sci-
ence/uae-looks-to-regulate-asteroid-mining-as-it-aims-to-lure-private-space-sector-
1.943028 [https://perma.cc/NCR7-UPLU]. According to the UAE Space
Agency, it is “ ‘[s]imilar to the principle of the law of the sea in international
waters where no state can claim sovereignty over the sea but commercial fishing
operations can own and sell what they obtain.’” Id.
126 Jeff Foust, Lunar Exploration Providing New Impetus for Space Resources Legal
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derstandings and ambiguities that would increase, rather than
mitigate, the potential for conflict.128
Belgium concludes that a “reasonable interpretation” of the
Outer Space Treaty “should lead to the finding that interna-
tional norms are the most suitable approach” for a space re-
source mining legal framework, and that “competent bodies”—
like COPUOS—should elaborate such norms.129 Thus, a shared
recognition of the possibility for property rights in space re-
sources, if achieved, would only be the first step; international
cooperation will be necessary to address the numerous issues
that will remain.130
V. CONCLUSIONS
As of this writing, Senator Ted Cruz’s proposed Space Fron-
tiers Act of 2019 is pending before the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation.131 Section 305 of the
proposed bill says “[i]t is the sense of Congress that . . . existing
guidelines for the mitigation of orbital debris may not be ade-
quate to ensure long-term usability of the space environment for
all users” and “the United States should continue to exercise a
leadership role in developing orbital debris prevention stan-
dards that may be used by all space-faring nations.”132 As the
foregoing demonstrates, one way the United States can lead is
through establishing a State practice of interpreting the due re-
gard principle as a meaningful tool for dealing with orbital deb-
ris. If the United States were to pursue this course, what
considerations follow? Three come to mind.
128 UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee, Contribution from Belgium to the Dis-
cussion on Item “General Exchange of Views on Potential Legal Models for Activ-
ities in Exploration, Exploitation and Utilization of Space Resources”, U.N. Doc.





130 Two such issues, as raised by Belgium, are (1) How any right of use of celes-
tial bodies’ mineral resources could be granted without allowing that entity to
claim exclusive access to a dedicated area of the celestial body surface and under-
ground; and (2) How limitations in terms of size and duration of activities associ-
ated with such right of use can be determined in a manner that would respect the
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131 Space Frontier Act of 2019, S. 919, 116th Cong. (1st Sess. 2019).
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First, it would be necessary to apply a top-down approach.
This is the most important lesson from U.S. experience in shap-
ing the meaning of “peaceful purposes” and the non-appropria-
tion principle. Even before the notion of “peaceful purposes” in
outer space became international law, President Kennedy di-
rected efforts to shape its meaning on the world stage. A series
of subsequent national space policies have reinforced this pre-
ferred meaning, which has now become widely accepted. Simi-
larly, Congress passed, and President Obama signed into law, a
statement of the U.S. position on space resource mining, ad-
vancing State practice in the application of the Outer Space
Treaty. As the ILC has concluded, subsequent State practice in
the application of a treaty may consist of the exercise of execu-
tive and legislative functions, including official statements of a
treaty’s meaning.133
Notably, this top-down approach is distinguishable from the
pursuit of bottom-up approaches that the United States gener-
ally favors for space. Bottom-up norms are “best practice guide-
lines intended to inform day-to-day operations” in outer
space.134 They “have received the most attention in recent years
because of their potential to enhance space safety and sus-
tainability as the number of space actors grows and the nature of
space activities changes.”135 Indeed, industry plays an increas-
ingly important role in establishing best-practices in outer space.
Bottom-up efforts can play an essential role in normalizing best-
practices internationally, and these best-practices can pave the
way for new legally binding rules, if desired. However, the bot-
tom-up approach will not suffice as a substitute for establishing
State practice in the application of Article IX of the Outer Space
Treaty pursuant to Article 32 of the VCLT. Working from the
bottom up may be effective for shaping non-legally binding
norms or developing domestic law, but it is States, through their
practice, that can shape the meaning of international law.
Second, the role of the customary international law on State
responsibility must be evaluated. Establishing a functional inter-
pretation of Article IX, which is already binding law on all
spacefaring States, would invoke the customary international law
of State responsibility in ways that non-binding norms concern-
ing orbital debris would not. A State’s identifiable breach of the
133 ILC Report, supra note 59, at 36–37.
134 Schaffer, supra note 93, at 88.
135 Id. at 88–89.
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due regard principle would constitute an internationally wrong-
ful act that entails the international responsibility of that
State.136
Responsibility under customary international law entails the
obligation to make reparations for any injury resulting from the
breach of the international obligation.137 This can be advanta-
geous because the imposition of economic consequences can
serve as a deterrent and reinforce the transnational legal pro-
cess, which is the process through which existing or revised
norms become internalized through interactions among States
and non-governmental actors.138 In addition, due to Article VI
of the Outer Space Treaty which directly imputes to States re-
sponsibility for non-governmental actors, economic conse-
quences can give States an added incentive to regulate
responsible behavior.139 Some may argue that binding law is dis-
advantageous because it restricts freedom of action in ways that
nonbinding guidelines do not, but these concerns can be easily
overstated. In fact, the general international law of State respon-
sibility recognizes numerous circumstances precluding wrong-
fulness, including self-defense, force majeure, and necessity.140
Third and finally, the problem of resolving disputes must be
addressed. Because of the reciprocal nature of the due regard
principle, challenges between legitimate activities are usually re-
solved through consultations, as the Chagos Award observed in
the context of the law of the sea.141 Unlike the law of the sea,
however, space law has no comparable arbitral regime to resolve
disputes when agreement cannot be reached. Both the United
States and the Soviet Union included articles on settlement of
disputes in their initial proposals for the Outer Space Treaty,
but in the end neither pushed for inclusion of a specific provi-
sion in the interest of expediting agreement on the Treaty as a
whole.142 Although Article IX contains a consultation mecha-
nism, it is unable to resolve disputes or establish responsibility.
Under this mechanism, the act of consulting is, by itself, enough
136 Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, at 32, U.N.
Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles on State Responsibility].
137 Id. at 91.
138 Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181,
183–84 (1996).
139 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 14, art. VI.
140 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 136, at 74–84.
141 Chagos Marine Protected Area (Mauritius v. U.K.), 31 R.I.A.A. 359, ¶ 519
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015).
142 Dembling & Arons, supra note 69, at 453.
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to meet the obligation, regardless of the consultation’s out-
come. Recourse to, or compliance with, Article IX’s consultation
mechanism should not be conflated with adherence to its due
regard obligation. They are not the same obligation, which is
why it would be important for the United States, in establishing
State practice, to disassociate Article IX’s due regard principle
from Article IX’s consultation mechanism.
Resolving disputes and assessing due regard violations will re-
quire international cooperation. In this regard, it is similar to
the ongoing legal developments in celestial body resource ex-
ploitation. In both instances, establishing a common functional
understanding of relevant legal provisions through State prac-
tice is only a first step. A leadership role for the United States
will not be limited to the deliberate, coordinated advancement
of State practice, but rather will necessarily extend to advancing
the principles of international cooperation and mutual assis-
tance, just as States are compelled to do under Article IX.
